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 Non-technical summary 
Innovation triggers positive effects on productivity and growth. It is therefore important to 
know whether taxation has an impact on research, development and innovation and whether 
taxation can be used as an instrument to foster research, development and innovation. Moreo-
ver, the generated intellectual assets can also increase the fiscal tax revenue. We add to the 
literature by analysing simultaneously effects from R&D tax incentives and corporate income 
tax burden on R&D investment and patenting behaviour of European corporations. We gener-
ate and use a panel of firm-specific patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO) 
from 1998 to 2007.  
We find positive effects of R&D tax incentives on the probability to invest in R&D in 
the R&D phase. The marginal effect is an 11% increase of the odds ratio for a ten percentage 
point decrease of the B-Index equaling the introduction of a 10% tax credit on R&D expendi-
tures. R&D tax incentives seem to increase the tendency of rather small firms to start invest-
ing in R&D. 
We find a negative effect of the combined statutory corporate income tax rate on the 
number of patent applications. The marginal effect is estimated as an increase of the average 
count of applications by 0.09 for a decrease of the corporate income tax rate of ten percentage 
points. The effect in countries with R&D tax incentives is 156% larger indicating a stronger 
sensitivity to tax issues. The effect of the corporate income tax rate is 120% larger for inven-
tions that were developed in cooperation with foreign inventors. Those cooperations seem to 
provide better opportunities for tax planning with IP ownership. Moreover, we find a marginal 
effect which is about 189% higher for firms with more than 5,000 employees. Larger firms 
have more options and more available locations in different countries to structure R&D phase 
and IP phase tax-efficiently with regard to the overall tax burden. 
A fiscal instrument to foster R&D activity in the own country could be the use of 
R&D tax incentives, which we found to have a positive effect on the probability to invest in 
R&D, especially for smaller firms. Another option would be to lower the corporate income 
tax rate which we found to increase patent applications and, also, earlier R&D investments in 
that specific country. 
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Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Innovationen wirken sich positiv auf Produktivität und Wachstum aus. Daher ist es wichtig zu 
wissen, ob die Besteuerung der Unternehmen einen Einfluss auf Forschung, Entwicklung und 
Innovation der Unternehmen hat. Umgekehrt können generierte immaterielle Wirtschaftsgüter 
auch das Steueraufkommen erhöhen. Wir betrachten die Auswirkungen der steuerlichen For-
schungsförderung auf die Phase der Investition in Forschung und Entwicklung (FuE) sowie 
die Auswirkungen der Besteuerung der Erträge auf die Phase der Generierung von immateri-
ellen Wirtschaftsgütern (insbesondere Patente) in einer Gesamtanalyse. Für die Analyse haben 
wir ein Modell definiert, bei dem Unternehmen die Verteilung von Forschungs- und Entwick-
lungsaufgaben sowie von immateriellen Wirtschaftsgütern im Konzern mit Blick auf die re-
sultierende Gesamtsteuerbelastung optimieren.Wir haben dazu einen Datensatz individuali-
sierter Patentanmeldungen europäischer Kapitalgesellschaften beim Europäischen Patentamt 
erstellt und für die Jahre 1998 bis 2007 analysiert. 
Wir finden in der Analyse positive Auswirkungen von Steueranreizen für FuE-Inputs auf die 
Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass wir eine Investition vor allem kleinerer Unternehmen in FuE be-
obachten. Das sogenannte Chancenverhältnis, dass ein Unternehmen in FuE investiert und ein 
Patent anmeldet, wird um 11% erhöht, wenn sich der sogenannte B-Index um 10 Prozent-
punkte vermindert. Eine solche Reduktion des B-Index ließe sich in etwa durch die Einfüh-
rung einer Steuergutschrift von 10% für FuE-Ausgaben erzielen. 
Wir finden zudem negative Auswirkungen des kombinierten tariflichen Ertragsteuersatzes für 
Kapitalgesellschaften auf die Anzahl der Patentanmeldungen. Demnach erhöht sich die durch-
schnittliche Anzahl der Patentanmeldungen um 0,09 wenn der Steuersatz um 10 Prozentpunk-
te fällt. Diese Reaktion auf die Steuerbelastung lässt sich durch steueroptimierte Ansiedlung 
von Forschungsaktivitäten und immateriellen Wirtschaftsgütern zwischen potentiellen Stand-
orten, aber auch durch steueroptimierte Aufgabenverteilung und Strukturierung von For-
schungsaufträgen im Konzern erklären. Zudem reagieren Unternehmen in Ländern mit Steu-
eranreizen für FuE um 156% stärker auf die Veränderung des Steuersatzes als das Gesamt-
sample. Wir beobachten auch einen um 120% stärkeren Effekt bei Forschungskooperationen 
über die Landesgrenzen hinweg. Die Reaktion auf den Steuersatz ist zudem bei großen Unter-
nehmen mit mehr als 5.000 Arbeitnehmern um 189% stärker ausgeprägt. 
Steueranreize für FuE-Inputs könnten demnach ein Instrument sein, den Einstieg kleinerer 
Unternehmen in FuE zu befördern und den Ort der physischen FuE-Kompetenz im Inland zu 
halten. Außerdem wirkt sich die Senkung des Steuersatzes positiv auf die Generierung und 
Verlagerung immaterieller Wirtschaftsgüter ins Inland aus, indirekt ist damit auch eine Erhö-
hung der FuE-Tätigkeit im Inland zu erwarten.  
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 Introduction 
Innovation triggers positive effects on productivity and growth. It is important to know 
whether taxation has an impact on research, development and innovation and whether taxation 
can be used as an instrument to foster research, development and innovation. Within the past 
two decades, many OECD member states have introduced or modified specific tax incentives 
to increase the business expenditures for research and development. Expenditures for research 
and development (R&D) generate a tax shield which reduces the firms’ tax base. Yet, taxation 
also reduces the yield from innovation. We add to the literature by analysing simultaneously 
effects from R&D tax incentives and corporate income tax burden on patenting behaviour. 
We generate and use a panel of firm-specific patent applications at the European Patent Office 
(EPO) from 1998 to 2007. Patent data from European countries were rarely used before in 
empirical tax-research. We also provide a year-specific measure of R&D tax incentives for a 
majority of the EU countries plus Norway.1 Our data is thus an innovative data set with mi-
cro-level data that captures up-to-date information and rarely used European data. Our contri-
bution to the literature is a simultaneous analysis of the impact of R&D tax incentives and the 
corporate tax on R&D activity and on patenting. Our results show that firms’ patenting activi-
ty reacts positively to R&D tax incentives as they increase the propensity to invest in R&D 
and to patent. We also find that firms in countries with R&D incentives react more sensitive 
to taxation. Moreover, a higher corporate income tax rate decreases the count of patent appli-
cations. We find that larger firms are more responsive to the combined corporate income tax 
rate than smaller ones. The same holds true for cross-border R&D cooperation which is found 
to be more responsive to the combined corporate income tax rate. Fiscal policy is found to 
interact with innovation policy offering opportunities to foster R&D and innovation in Eu-
rope. 
The literature on innovation shows that R&D activity is influenced by many factors. 
For multinational groups, the respective technological strengths and weaknesses of the group 
and of the potential host country matter (Kuemmerle (1997); Le Bas and Sierra (2002)). The 
size of the market is important when products should be adapted to the specific market (Mans-
field et al. (1979); Patel and Vega (1999)). The supply of R&D staff and high-quality infra-
structure are important location factors (Cantwell and Piscitello (2005)). The typical activities 
of the specific group-members are decisive for the acquisition of R&D assignments (Guimón 
(2009)). A typical pathway in the globalisation of R&D leads from production and technical 
assignments to R&D (Lall (1979); Defever (2006): 675 f.). Studies also reveal a positive ef-
                                                 
1  We use the so called B-Index as underlying methodology. The B-Index is a measure for the fiscal generosity 
of a tax system towards R&D investment and equals the tax component of R&D user costs. Lower values of the 
B-Index indicate higher incentives from the tax system for investments in R&D capital. A detailed illustration of 
the B-Index can be found in 1.1.1. The index can be interpreted as the tax component of the user costs of R&D. 
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fect of cost-savings which includes beneficial tax treatment (Patel and Vega (1999): 146-147; 
Kumar (2001): 171; Edler et al. (2003): 86; Hollenstein (2008): 11 f.).2 
A large strand of literature analyses the effects of R&D tax incentives on business 
R&D activity and finds substantial evidence that they have a positive effect. Hall and van 
Reenen (2000) as well as Bloom et al. (2002) estimate an elasticity for R&D performed of 
approximatelly -1 regarding the so called user cost of R&D capital, although Hall and van 
Reenen find strong variation in their survey.3 Parsons and Phillips (2007) present an elasticity 
of -1.2 (on average) in the long run comparing seventeen different studies. A small part of that 
literature focuses on the influence of R&D tax incentives on the relocation of R&D across 
borders. Billings (2003) finds a higher average growth rate of R&D performed in foreign af-
filiates of US multinationals in countries offering tax incentives. Bloom and Griffith (2001) 
find that R&D in one country responds positively to decreases of the user cost of R&D in for-
eign countries, which they explain by “footloose” R&D that was shifted to foreign locations. 
Hall and van Reenen (2000) raise the question of “footloose” R&D in their study as well. 
These studies provide evidence that tax incentives can reward the relocation of R&D activity. 
Another small strand of literature investigates the effects of the corporate tax burden 
on the location of patents and intellectual property. Mutti and Grubert (2008) find indirect ev-
idence that high royalty revenues in US companies are more often obtained in foreign low-tax 
subsidiaries. Karkinsky and Riedel (2009) find a decrease of -2.9% on the number of patent 
applications at the European Patent Office (EPO) for a one percentage point increase of the 
corporate income tax rate between 1995 and 2003. Dischinger and Riedel (2010) find a de-
creasing volume of intangible assets with increasing tax burden in subsidiaries of multination-
al groups. They find that a decrease in the average tax difference to other affiliates by 1 per-
centage point raises the subsidiary’s level of intangible assets by 1.6%. These studies provide 
evidence that a higher tax rate can decrease patenting activity. 
The paper is structured as follows: We first provide a discussion of the parameters for 
taxation and tax planning with R&D and intellectual property (IP) ownership. Second, we de-
scribe the data used. Third, we conduct an empirical analysis including several sensitivity 
analyses. Forth, we conclude.  
1 R&D and Patenting and Interaction with Taxation 
We analyse tax treatment and tax planning with inputs in and outputs from R&D activity. On 
the output side, we especially focus on patents. Patents are an important sort of intellectual 
assets in multinational firms and are often used as indicator for innovative activity, for exam-
                                                 
2  Others: Hines (1994); Yang and Jiang (2007): 352; Atkinson (2007): 621. 
3  The elasticity is defined as 1% change of the dependent variable for a 1% change of the independent variable. 
User costs of R&D can be defined as costs that arise for a firm to borrow and use a unit of R&D capital for one 
period. The lower these user cost are the higher should be the amount of private R&D investment. See in detail 
in1.1.1. 
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ple in Acs et al. (2002), Cantwell and Piscitello (2005), Le Bas and Sierra (2002), Harhoff and 
Thoma (2009)). Also, R&D and patenting can be regarded as closely related to each other, as 
many empirical results show: Griliches (1990); Hall et al. (1986) and Bosch et al. (2005) find 
a strong relationship between patents and R&D. We thus take patent applications as measure 
for the output from R&D inputs. We furthermore employ the link between R&D activity and 
patenting to use patent applications as a proxy for the scale of R&D inputs in our analysis in 
chapter 3. We do this, as it is not possible to observe the necessary firm-specific R&D ex-
penditures directly. The proxy seems to be reasonable as we find that the country of the inven-
tor, as a proxy for the place of R&D activity, and the country of the patent applicant are equal 
for 92% of the applications in our sample and we indeed observe the location of R&D activity 
in most cases by observing the location of the patent applicant. 
We use the patent applicants rather than the patent inventors - which are both recorded 
in an application. The patent applicant is the legal owner of the patent at the time of applica-
tion because only the legal owner of the underlying invention is entitled to apply for a patent. 
We find it convincing to focus on the patent applicant because the legal owner of a patent is 
also the relevant subject for taxation (Quick and Day (2006)). Doing so, we trace patents 
which result from the applicant’s own R&D activity, his joint R&D activity together with oth-
ers or R&D activity the applicant has contracted out.4 
1.1 Taxation 
In the following, we describe the most important tax parameters and channels of interaction 
between taxation, R&D activity and intellectual property (IP) ownership. We also briefly dis-
cuss possible ways how the legal owner could react to the tax burden, how he could do tax 
planning and how we observe it in our data. 
Figure 1: Interaction with taxation in the R&D-phase and in the IP-phase. 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
                                                 
4  We do not trace subsequent trading or licensing after the patent application, because it is not possible with 
the data available to us. We rather focus on the initial distribution and localisation of patent applicants, which we 
expect to be determined - besides other factors - by R&D tax incentives and the tax rate. 
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Regarding the time structure, we divide the patent-generating process into two stages: First, 
the period when R&D is undertaken and tax deductible R&D costs occur (R&D phase); Se-
cond, the period when the patent application is filed and the IP generates income (IP owner-
ship phase). A rational management that maximizes the firm’s value should do tax planning to 
keep the firm’s costs and tax burden low. Costs include the tax burden for the R&D invest-
ment project (R&D phase) and the generated intellectual assets (IP phase). Figure 1 displays 
the following considerations in a structured graph. 
1.1.1 Tax Incentives in the R&D Phase 
The management of a firm that optimises the firm’s value will invest in R&D capital until the 
marginal product from R&D capital multiplied by the market price of R&D capital equals the 
user cost for R&D capital5: 
1 1
1 1
t t t
t t
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K
 
 
   
1tP  equals the market price of a unit of produced output from R&D. The derivation of the 
production function F  with respect to the stock of R&D capital K  indicates the marginal 
product from R&D capital. Finally, 1tC   is defined as the user cost of R&D capital. In other 
words, the firm will invest in R&D capital until the last (marginal) R&D project yields a re-
turn equal to the user cost of R&D. The user cost of R&D is 1
1R&D
Z*tC P *( )*( )
t
  .  
  is the firm-specific rate of return which must be earned to pay the shareholders;   is the 
economic depreciation of the R&D capital stock and   is the rate of inflation reducing the 
price of a unit of R&D in the next period. R&DP  denotes the market price of a unit of R&D 
capital, for example the hourly wage for an engineer. A firm renting one unit of R&D capital 
for one year must earn at least the market price for that unit plus it’s depreciation plus the re-
quired return for the shareholders. The amount is lessened by the inflation on the price for 
R&D. A firm should invest in projects with a larger return and it should stop projects having a 
return below the user costs of R&D. If we set R&DP  to one and   to zero, we can simplify the 
user costs of R&D capital to: 1
1
Z* tC ( )*( )
t
   
. We can now decompose the user cost in a 
“tax” component 1
1
Z* t( )
t

  , which is equal to the B-Index, and an “economic” component 
( )    (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003): 229). Bloom et al. (2002) find 
that the tax component rather than the economic component of user costs R&D has an influ-
ence on business R&D. We, thus, choose the B-Index instead of the full user cost. The poten-
                                                 
5  The following derivation of user costs for R&D on this page is taken from the report of the Expert Group on 
R&D Tax Incentives Evaluation (2008). 
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tial number of R&D projects should increase for a decreasing B-Index (Warda (2001)) as the 
index is a multiplier in the formula of the user cost of R&D which raises or lowers them. 
The B-Index equals 1
1
Z*t( )
t

  
. The numerator represents the net present value of an 
investment in a unit of R&D after having considered the tax shield and possible tax credits for 
R&D expenditures. The firm which invests a monetary unit in R&D must first earn the gross 
amount at the market and is taxed on its return with the combined statutory corporate income 
tax rate t . Therefore, 1( Z* t )  must be divided by 1( t )  to arrive at the so called net tax price 
of R&D capital from retained earnings. Z  is the present value of tax depreciation, tax allow-
ances and tax credits for R&D expenditures and equals one if all R&D expenditures are im-
mediately deductible from the taxable base (B then equals one and taxation has no influence 
on the R&D user costs). See Table A-2 for more details on the calculation of Z .  
We use the B-Index in our analysis as measure for the available R&D tax incentives in 
a jurisdiction. Tax credits for R&D expenditures in 2007 were granted in Austria, France, Ire-
land, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. They differ according to whether they can be 
applied on the whole R&D expenditures (volume-based) or only on the increase in expendi-
tures (incremental). Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and the 
United Kingdom apply tax incentives in the form of extra-deductions from the taxable base 
which exceed the actual expenditures. Belgium and Poland grant the incentive for investments 
in fixed assets only. R&D capital expenditures, such as R&D equipment like laboratory ma-
chinery, microscopes, must be capitalised and are in most cases subject to depreciation like 
non-R&D assets, except that there is accelerated depreciation. Belgium, Greece and the Unit-
ed Kingdom grant accelerated depreciation for certain investments in fixed assets used for 
R&D. Belgium and the Netherlands apply a special form of R&D tax incentive by cutting 
costs for R&D personnel from the payable wage tax.6 Figure 2 displays the development of 
the B-Index for large firms in selected countries. The underlying parameters can be found in 
Table A-3.7 Spain and Portugal, followed by Hungary, display low values for the B-Index in 
the whole period. Countries like the Czech Republic, France, Italy and Malta display higher 
values with strong decreases of the B-Index in 2004 and 2005. The United Kingdom displays 
a strong decrease in 2002 indicating the introduction of the extra allowance for R&D costs. 
Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands kept almost constant values over time.  
                                                 
6  Wage tax is withheld from employees wage payments but paid net of R&D subsidy to the fiscal authorities, 
thus resulting in a tax benefit for the employing firm. 
7  Refunding, carry back and carry forward of unused tax credits can’t be taken into account. It is assumed that 
R&D is fully eligible for the credit and does not exceed limits. We assume 60% of R&D expenditures for labour, 
30% for other current expenditures and 10% for capital expenditures. The employed discount rate is 10 %. We 
focus on R&D subsidies eligible for R&D in the private sector. Hence, specific and usually more beneficial in-
centives for supporting public R&D, as it was the case for example in Denmark, are not in our calculation. R&D 
with public institutions only accounts for a few percent of the overall R&D expenditures. For example, in 2007 
the share was 4.1% in Germany, see Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2009): 30 f. 
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Figure 2: Development of the B-Index on R&D costs in selected countries. 
 
Note: The graphic displays the development of the B-Index for large firms from 1998 to 2007. Lower values indicate a more 
attractive tax environment for business R&D and vice versa. Source: Own calculations. 
However, there is an obvious trend towards lower values for the B-Index.8 Tax planning with 
R&D tax incentives includes deferral of R&D expenditures or acceleration of R&D projects 
by managing R&D projects in a tax-efficient manner. Decelerating a project could be useful 
when the government for example announces the introduction of an incentive in the following 
fiscal year. 
Capitalization of R&D costs: The immediate deduction of the R&D costs reduces tax-
able income and thus tax payments. R&D costs usually consist of revenue expenditures (for 
example for R&D staff) and capital expenditures (for example R&D equipment). The ques-
tion arises whether R&D revenue expenditures need to be capitalised as an asset in its own 
right when they represent an independent economic value.9 If deducted, they become tax-
effective in the same year. If capitalized, they lower the taxable income of the current and the 
following period by way of depreciation and it takes longer until they become fully tax-
effective. Capitalisation usually results in a disadvantageous interest effect and mandatory 
capitalisation, thus, represents an economic disadvantage for profitable firms and increases 
the B-Index. 
                                                 
8  Tax incentives based on IP ownership emerged only recently or were expanded in recent years, like in Bel-
gium in 2008, the Netherlands in 2007 and Spain in 2008 (France and Ireland extended their low tax regime in 
2008). Therefore, they are not considered in this study. See e.g. Eynatten (2008); Eynatten and Brauns (2010); 
Taieb (2008); Nárdiz (19). 
9  Greece, Norway, Poland and Slovakia require mandatory capitalisation either of research or development 
costs or both as far as the R&D project fulfills certain objectivity requirements. Within these countries, the value 
of such capitalised R&D expenditures is usually depreciated over 5 years. The other countries either treat R&D 
costs as expenses or capitalisation is optional (Verlinden and Smits (2009); IBFD (2009a); Endres et al. (2007); 
OECD (2009)). Additional sources for financial accounting are Hoogendoorn (1996); Liangqi (1994); Swanson 
and Singer (2002); Jacobs (2007). 
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1.1.2 Taxation in the IP Ownership Phase 
R&D activities generate R&D costs that are deductible from the firm’s income tax base. They 
create a valuable tax shield equaling the net present value of deductible costs multiplied by 
the tax rate. The value of the tax shield thus increases with the tax rate given the availability 
of profits to balance the costs and to avoid losses. The profitability of R&D investments plays 
an important role as the taxation of profits and the treatment of deductions or losses, such as 
loss carry-back, carry-forward or taxation with group-relief, may generate contrary incentives 
for tax planning. R&D is risky (Harhoff et al. (1999)), but studies show that the private yield 
on business R&D on average is positive and even higher than the yield to physical capital 
(Sougiannis (1994); Hall and Oriani (2006); Hall et al. (2010)). Moreover, a potential patent 
applicant at the EPO has to bear high costs (roughly €5K) to push an application. An EPO ap-
plication observed by us thus reflects particularly successful R&D activity. Our further analy-
sis accordingly focuses on profitable R&D-projects. 
Taxation of return from generated IP: Corresponding to the deductibility of expendi-
tures, the return from R&D activities is subject to tax irrespective of the kind of return. The 
return might be directly from increased turnover or indirectly via licensing or selling a patent. 
Under the general taxation principles, these results are subject to the income tax of the legal 
owner, which is presumably the patent applicant that we observe. It is mainly the domestic tax 
rate that matters in this respect because a major part of the taxable profits will arise from do-
mestic sources.10 However, if profits stem from sources in foreign countries, these foreign 
countries may have, depending on the kind of transaction and the underlying structure, a right 
to tax these profits. Allmost all countries in our study have agreed on treaties among each oth-
er to avoid double taxation. Those treaties entitle the country of the recipient of royalties to 
tax the profits and they limit withholding tax rates in the foreign country to 12% and below.11 
The directive on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments of 
the Council of the European Union (2003/49/EG) also set the withholding tax rates to zero for 
royalty payments among members of multinational groups within the common market in the 
EU since 2004.12 The domestic tax rates are above both levels and determine the effective tax 
burden. We can thus focus on the domestic tax rate.13 Tax-efficient behaviour could defer tax-
ation to a later point by shifting the filing date of the application or by relying on secrecy in-
stead of patenting. Know-how is more difficult to observe and to evaluate for fiscal authorities 
                                                 
10  Just 35% of a sample of European companies declared that they license out patents to other companies. 28% 
of those companies licensed out more than 40% of their patents to partners in foreign countries, see Zuniqa and 
Guellec (2009): 14. 
11  These rates apply for royalties for industrial know-how and patents. Exceptions are Greece, Ireland, Slovakia 
and Portugal, which have no treaty in a few cases. 
12  However, transitional periods apply for the Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Poland and Portugal. 
13  The only exception is Slovenia, where we found an exemption for foreign royalty income from 1998 to 2001, 
which lowers the effective tax burden to the foreign withholding tax rate. 
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than a patent and offers more options to shape the tax burden. A granted patent immediately 
attracts taxable income as it becomes manifest as an asset and the subsequent user in the pro-
duction chain has to finance the return form the IP. The use of know-how in a unit or within a 
group is to a larger extent informal and can defer tax payment as the return on the IP is then 
financed by the consumer at the end of the value chain when he pays an increased price for 
the purchased product. 
1.1.3 Group Structures 
The net principle for taxation implies that a firm is entitled to deduct its costs for R&D given 
that the R&D activity supports the firm’s business. Thus, among the associated entities of a 
multinational group, the entity which economically backs risks and costs and is the benefi-
ciary of the results, is entitled to use the tax shield from the costs. A main target of tax plan-
ning is the use of differences in the international levels of taxation by allocating costs to firms 
in high tax locations and earnings to low tax locations. Yet, R&D and resulting IP must be 
analysed and optimized together as it is not straightforward to separate them for tax purposes. 
A multinational group with firms in high-tax and low-tax locations can choose a li-
censing model where an especially dedicated IP-firm conducts R&D, acquires ownership of 
the results and licenses the IP to other entities (Norton and Burns (2006)). The IP-firm bears 
costs and risks and allocates the costs subsequently to firms that use the IP by charging royal-
ties. The IP-firm as licensor can use available domestic R&D tax incentives for its underlying 
intramural R&D activity. The IP-firm and the licensees can also try to use their differing stat-
utory income tax rates to shape the allocation of taxable profits (Adams and Godshaw 
(2002)). However, the payments for taxation must be determined according to the arm’s 
length principle (Marti and Ledergerber (2005): 188), which in principle equals the “market 
price” among unassociated parties (Fletcher and Cawdron (2006)).14 Tax authorities also chal-
lenge the deduction of royalties as hidden distribution of profits if a firm pays for patents it 
does not use (Eynatten (2008): 504). If, on the other hand, the firm uses patents without pay-
ing, tax authorities might challenge it as constructive equity contribution. The result will be 
corrections if the payments deviate from reasonable prices. There is growing attention of tax 
authorities for transfer pricing (Ernst&Young (2008): 5; Henshall (2010)). The central IP-firm 
should therefore reside in a low-tax country with a generous R&D tax incentive to be tax-
efficient as the scope for shifting profits and costs with transfer pricing is rather limited.  
                                                 
14  The determination of the “market value” raises serious problems (Vögele et al. (2004): chapter P, note 247). 
Intangibles are used in different markets and in different enterprises and it is often hardly possible to find a com-
parable transaction between unassociated parties. The most important methods to measure the applicable price 
are the Comparable Uncontrolled Transaction Method (OECD (2009), chapter II, 2.6–2.13), the Residual Profit 
Split (OECD (2009), chapter II, 3.5–3.25) and some nationally accepted rules of thumb (Adams and Godshaw 
(2002); Marti and Ledergerber (2005): 190; Verlinden and Smits (2009): 86 f., 97 f.). 
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Figure 3 displays a contract R&D-structure across border (Vögele et al. (2004): chap-
ter P, note 58). Contract R&D is an option to divide the place of R&D activity and the place 
of IP-ownership which is recognized for tax purposes if the IP-firm as a principal effectively 
directs the undertaken R&D of the contractor (R&D firm) and provides the know-how. It  
Figure 3: Structure of cross-border contract R&D and purchase of a patent. 
Contract R&D Purchase of Patent 
  
Source: Own illustration. 
must also effectively bear the risks (Henshall (2010)). The principal’s accounting for contract 
R&D is similar to the accounting for intramural R&D: The principal acquires the ownership 
and the tax shield from costs for contract R&D and would be observable as patent applicant.15 
The payment from the principal to the contractor according to arm’s length includes the costs 
plus a rather low premium16 as the contractor bears no risk. Most of the taxable return from 
R&D in this model arises therefore in the country of the principal and not in the country of the 
contractor. This makes the tax rate of the IP-firm the most important factor. Contract R&D is, 
thus, effective for allocating IP in a low tax location while keeping R&D activity physically at 
a high tax location. The principal can also profit from R&D tax incentives in many coun-
tries.17 Groups can use the domestic R&D tax incentives by replacing former intramural R&D 
with contract R&D in foreign countries.18 Intramural R&D, formerly done in the German 
R&D-firm, could be replaced with contract R&D from a new Austrian IP-firm to the German 
R&D-firm. IP and patents would then accrue within the Austrian IP-firm and the group could, 
as a result, use the tax credit of 8% in Austria and reduce the tax rate on profits from IP from 
39.35% in Germany to 25% in Austria. 
A purchase of ready-made IP is given if the IP was created by a supplier (R&D-firm) 
and sold to an acquirer (IP-firm). The supplier backs the risk, provides the know-how, manag-
es the work and acquires transitional ownership and, thus, becomes observable as patent ap-
                                                 
15  The principal backs the risk of unsuccessful R&D (OECD (2009): chapter VII, note 7.41). Capitalisation of 
the costs, thus, depends on comparable rules as for own intramural R&D. 
16  OECD (2009), chapter VII, note 7.41; Debatin et al. (2009): MA Art. 9, note 335. 
17  Those countries are: Austria, Spain, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
18  This opportunity for tax planning originates from the freedom of establishment and services (Art. 43 and 
Art. 49 EC Treaty) in jurisdictions that provide tax subsidies for contract R&D and was confirmed by decision of 
the European Court of Justice (see e.g. ECJ, 10. 3. 2005 - C-39/04, Laboratoires Fournier SA/Direction des véri-
fications nationales et internationales); Schuch and Wehinger (2005); Scheunemann and Dennisen (2010)). 
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plicant. R&D costs are eligible for R&D tax incentives in the country of the R&D-firm as the 
supplier. Selling the patent implies that the underlying legal title is transferred by way of as-
signation (Vögele et al. (2004), chapter P, note 251). Arm’s length considerations apply 
among affiliated entities, and, as the supplier backs the risks, he obtains a payment including 
its costs plus a high premium. The high premium is subject to tax in the country of the suppli-
er which makes the tax rate of the supplier the most important parameter. Structuring R&D 
and IP-ownership by using intra-group purchasing of IP provides a way to locate R&D and IP 
initialy in a country with generous R&D tax incentives and a low tax rate. 
Shifting IP to foreign tax locations to obtain a lower tax burden is generally possible. 
Yet, it is too late to shift for tax-purposes if IP already generates income or is otherwise visi-
ble for tax authorities. The gains from transferring the assets and possible hidden reserves are 
taxable in the country of origin and they can trigger adverse tax effects that make the shifting 
of IP useless (Frick and Kronauer (2005)). The transferred assets will be subject to tax at the 
“market value” of the asset less its residual book value in tax accounting (Figure 4).19 
Figure 4: Tax effects for cross-border shifting of IP. 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
A tax-efficient strategy could be to shift IP before a taxable value becomes obvious (Meeker 
(2003)). However, fiscal authorities are aware of such transfers and there is a high risk that 
the transaction will be uncovered and corrected. Therefore, tax-efficient structuring of the 
R&D phase and the IP ownership phase in a group should be done beforehand as it is costly 
after the assignment of R&D tasks. 
To sum up, the initial patent applicant in a tax-efficient structure would reside in all 
three models in a low tax location with also generous R&D tax incentives. Shifting IP across 
                                                 
19  There are further models to structure IP ownership tax-efficiently. One example are cost-sharing agreements 
that enable several firms to cooperate in R&D projects and to share costs and results from IP equally among the 
them. However, we found only very few obvious cases of cost-sharing in our data. Other models include the use 
of foreign permanent establishments to locate IP and to shift IP across borders. It also seems to be possible to use 
the tax-efficient transaction of shares in an IP-holding. However, it is hardly possible to observe these structures 
in our data and the economic relevance of these structures is unclear. We are confident that we cover the most 
important and relevant structures in our discussion in 1.1.1., 1.1.2. and 1.1.3. 
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borders at a later point is costly and we assume that the management optimizes the R&D 
phase and the IP phase beforehand and with a view on the overall tax burden. The initial dis-
tribution of R&D and IP, and accordingly, the distribution of patent applicants, should be 
shaped by taxation in the R&D phase and in the IP phase. 
1.2 Summary and Hypotheses 
A management that maximizes the firm’s value should do tax planning to keep the firm’s 
costs and tax burden low. From a time perspective, we assume two-stages: The R&D phase 
and the IP ownership phase. Tax planning to achieve a beneficial structuring for tax purposes 
considers the overall tax burden in both phases. Planning should be done before assigning 
R&D tasks, as the potential for tax planning with R&D and IP ownership, after having set the 
location for R&D, is rather limited because transfer pricing and exit-taxation eliminate poten-
tial tax benefits. This implies that firms optimize R&D phase and IP phase simultaneously as 
a trade-off between tax-effects for the former and for the latter (see Figure 5). Choosing a 
specific firm to invest in R&D and, consequently, to become the entity which files the appli-
cation also determines the country and the country-specific (tax) parameters. The applicant, 
which we observe in the data, is the relevant person to analyse tax behaviour as he initially 
bears the R&D costs and bears the tax effects in the R&D phase, acquires IP ownership and 
bears the tax effects in the IP phase in the above described structures.  
Figure 5: Decision-Tree for R&D investment and Patenting. 
Source: Own illustration. 
A firm that maximizes the firm value and faces lower user costs for R&D should in-
vest more in R&D projects and vice versa. The management should furthermore optimize the 
tax effects in the R&D phase by managing R&D tax-efficiently, by avoiding the capitalization 
of R&D costs and by using R&D tax incentives. R&D tax incentives can also be used for con-
tract R&D across borders. The measure that captures the underlying incentives in the R&D 
phase for the empirical analysis is the B-Index. We thus expect that firms invest more in R&D 
and generate more patent applications when R&D tax incentives are generous and we thus 
expect a negative effect of the B-Index in our empirical analysis. 
The firm should also optimize tax effects for the IP phase by managing patenting ver-
sus secrecy tax-efficiently and by minimizing the tax rate. Groups use several models for the 
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tax-efficient structuring of their R&D assignments and IP ownership. The measure that covers 
the underlying incentives in the IP phase is the combined statutory corporate income tax rate. 
Applications reflect successful R&D with a positive return and we thus expect a negative ef-
fect of the combined statutory corporate income tax rate on patent applications in our empiri-
cal analysis. 
2 Data 
2.1 Sample and Dependent Variable 
We take data from the European Patent Office’s Bulletin. The EPO’s Bulletin provides sepa-
rate name and address details for each patent applicant and inventor. An application can be 
made both by natural and juridical persons and jointly with several other applicants. We ex-
tracted the applicant’s name, legal form, address and country; however, we dropped applica-
tions from unincorporated entities.20 We checked for abbreviations for unincorporated legal 
forms and checked applicants without legal form manually (those account for 9% of the ap-
plications). Standardisation of name and address, for example extraction of legal form and 
abbreviation of frequent words, made it possible to group applicants across years by a unique 
identification number and to cumulate their count of patent applications. In case we recorded 
no application for the identification number in a certain year, we assumed a zero as observa-
tion in case that there was an earlier EPO application of the person_id.21 The resulting panel is 
unbalanced and consists of “panel_ids”, each representing a unique incorporated firm. The 
dependent variable in our study is the count of patent applications that a particular firm sub-
mitted in a specific year.22 
In order to gather firm-specific information, such as the number of employees or total 
assets in the balance, we merge data from the Amadeus-database to the applicants. According-
ly, we had to match the addresses of the applicants in the EPO-Bulletin and the addresses in 
Amadeus. First, the address fields from the EPO Bulletin and Amadeus were split into name, 
legal form, address, city, zipcode etc. Second, these fields were harmonised in several steps in 
both datasets to obtain comparable sets of records, which can be compared in an automated 
                                                 
20  We dropped unincorporated applicants as those firms are subject to different tax rules and tax rates (income 
tax rather than corporate income tax) compared to incorporated firms. 
21  The very first EPO application was in 1977. We set the dependent variable to missing in the years between 
1977 and the first EPO application of the person_id. 
22  More precisely, we sum up the firm’s application shares in a specific year. We compute the sum of the firm’s 
application shares by taking the inverse of the number of applicants of each single patent application. For exam-
ple, an application was filed by firm A and firm B, we take 1/2 for firm A and 1/2 for firm B, which equals one 
in total. The so computed count sometimes is no whole number/integer, for example when the firm’s share is 0.5. 
However, this had no impact on our quantitative results. It is also possible to count each involvement of an ap-
plicant in a patent application. For example, we could count one for applicant A and one for applicant B if A and 
B are registered as patent applicants for the same patent (in total: 2). However, it turned out that the choice of the 
procedure was irrelevant to our quantitative results. For the sake of simplicity we refer to the variable as “count 
of patent applications”. 
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process. For example, typical abbreviations of legal forms in the name field were searched, 
extracted from the name field and harmonised. Third, a record linkage tool was applied which 
runs a probabilistic match algorithm involving name, legal form, address, country etc. (Blas-
nik (2010)). The observations with poor match results23 were checked manually. We could 
also significantly improve the number of matched patent applications by comparing our re-
sults to the results of a match done by Thoma et al. (2010), which was kindly provided to us. 
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1, Table A-4 and Table A-5. We analyse applica-
tions with a priority date, which is in most cases equal to the date of the application, between 
1998 and 2007 as our firm data is available from 1998 onwards only. 
Table 1: Identification process between EPO Bulletin and AMADEUS (count of applicants) 
Patent applications 
EPO applications  
from EEA states 
(Source: EPO Bulle-
tin) 
Applications matched  
with AMADEUS 
Applications matched with 
AMADEUS and with full firm-
specific and country specific varia-
bles 
Year of Priority Sum Mean Sum Mean Sum 
1998 46,579 1.18 33,057 2.42 12,218 
1999 50,979 1.19 36,219 2.77 17,496 
2000 53,852 1.16 38,328 2.49 16,757 
2001 53,702 1.10 38,603 2.33 18,434 
2002 53,982 1.05 38,729 2.01 15,582 
2003 55,278 1.01 39,040 2.01 16,750 
2004 57,859 0.99 39,902 1.98 15,040 
2005 59,434 0.97 40,556 1.90 18,121 
2006 60,550 0.94 40,909 1.90 20,414 
2007 33,874 0.51 22,296 1.06 11,133 
Total 526,087 0.99 367,639 2.01 161,945 
In total, we were able to identify 69.9% (=367,639 / 526,087) of the applications to the 
EPO from applicants in EEA member states (EEA states state our basic population). The iden-
tification ratio by country, however, varies across countries (Table A-4). The 5 largest EU 
countries by population are, for example, covered at rates between 51% for Spain and 74% for 
the United Kingdom. Differences in the identification process can be attributed to characteris-
tics of the applicants like size, group structures, history of applying at the EPO and coverage 
by the Amadeus-database. We use observations only if we can specify the number of employ-
ees and total assets of the individual firm to control for firm-specific time-variant effects. The 
basic estimation sample, therefore, consists of 80,484 observations. Each observation repre-
sents the count of applications in a specific year for a specific firm. We would, for example, 
observe “3” for firm A in 2000 if firm A would have done 3 patent applications in the year 
2000. The observations spread over twenty countries24 for the years 1998 to 2007. Altogether, 
                                                 
23  Poor matches were defined as matches where name and address were unequal (no perfect match of the names 
and address fields) but the similarity was greater than (approx.) 0.66 (on a scale from 0 to 1, with 1 – indicating a 
perfect match) in the probabilistic match algorithm.  
24  Which are AT, BE, CZ, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LU, NL, NO, PL, PT, SE, SK. Switzer-
land is excluded from the study as the combined tax rate varies across the 26 cantons and several specific tax 
regimes exist, especially for IP holding corporations. We can neither reliably observe the canton nor the benefi-
cial tax regime. 
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the count of all patent applications in the sample is 161,945 (Table 1, column 6), which results 
in an average of 2.01 (=161,945 / 80,484) applications for each firm in our sample per year. 
The average numbers of patent applications (mean) in Table 1 decrease slightly from 1998 
onwards indicating that the identified applicants are slightly biased towards larger corpora-
tions in earlier years as those larger companies are more likely recorded in Amadeus. Table 2 
provides statistics of the basic sample, that we use for the regressions. 
Table 2: Summary statistic (pooled). 
Variable Description / Scale in 
summary table 
Unit Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Scale in 
regression 
Patent Applications Number  80,484 2.012 23.015 0.000 2,064  
Comb. Corp. Stat. Tax 
Rate 
0-1 scale C 
80,484 0.336 0.046 0.125 0.560 
 
EATR 0-1 scale C 80,484 0.313 0.043 0.094 0.412  
EATR (Intangibles) 0-1 scale C 80,484 0.281 0.040 0.093 0.380  
B-Index (large)  C 80,484 0.938 0.136 0.428 1.069  
GDP p. capita € (market pr.) C 80,484 26,577 5,088 3,700 60,680 Log 
Pub. R&DStaff p. capita Number C 80,484 0.0006 0.0003 0.0002 0.0015  
Students p. capita Number (Tert Educat.) C 80,484 0.0360 0.0063 0.0056 0.0588  
Ginarte-Park (Index for patent rights, 0-
5 scale) 
C 
80,484 4.558 0.145 2.760 4.670 
 
Openness Share of Import + Export 
to GDP 
C 
80,484 0.567 0.299 0.180 2.240 
 
High-tech export Share of GDP C 80,484 0.054 0.036 0.004 0.375  
Governm. funded 
BERD 
Share of GDP C 
80,484 0.0009 0.0004 0.0000 0.0022 
 
Firm-specific  
Employees 
Number F 
80,484 1,244.756 10,446 1 502,763 
Log 
Firm-specific  
Total Assets 
€ Mio. F 
80,484 488.020 5,298 0 277,720 
Log 
Notes: “Log” indicates that the variable is put in natural logarithm in the regression. "C" denotes country specific variables 
and "F" denotes firm-specific variables. Firms showing zero patent applications in all years (1998 to 2007) were dropped as 
they also drop out of the fixed-effects regressions. 
2.2 Tax Variables 
We use the synthetic measure B-Index to gauge tax induced changes in the user cost of R&D 
capital (Methodology according to McFetridge and Warda (1983a); Warda (1990); Guellec 
and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003) / Source: Own calculations; details in Tables A-2 
and A-3). Lower values of the B-Index, for example as a result of a tax credit for R&D, indi-
cate a lower threshold for the minimum return for R&D investments. Thus, a lower B-Index is 
supposed to trigger more R&D investments and resulting patents. The Index is a frequently 
used approach; Guellec and Pottelsberghe (2003), Falk (2006), Baghana and Mohnen (2009) 
and Wilson (2009), for example, rely on this methodology. The B-Index measure does not 
account for tax exhaustion or thresholds above which the incentive is not granted and is, thus, 
imprecise for R&D tax incentives with thresholds or firms generating losses. Thresholds exist 
in most countries. Therefore, the index might reveal a lower explanatory power in the regres-
sion for firms with R&D budgets above those country-specific thresholds, which range be-
tween €110K in the Netherlands and €16M in France. Other examples are €15M in Italy, 35% 
of corporate income tax in Spain or the amount of social security contributions and wage 
withholding tax in the UK. 
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We also use combined statutory corporate income tax rates (“corporate income tax 
rate”) (Source: OECD, Taxation of Corporate and Capital Income) to cover the taxation of 
profits from IP. The rates include central and regional statutory tax rates. They capture an im-
portant parameter for multinational groups when it comes to a location decision (Buettner und 
Ruf (2007); Devereux (2007); Russo et al. (2007): 94-98). The combined statutory corporate 
income tax rate represents an appropriate measure for the tax burden of specifically profitable 
investments as the tax deductible costs, which would reduce the taxable base, are neglected. 
The combined statutory corporate income tax rate does not account for the tax shield from 
financing and focuses only on the taxation of returns. Correlation between B-Index and the 
combined statutory corporate income tax rate in our sample is small (0.02). Attractive tax 
conditions for production and supporting activities for R&D, like capital allowances for ma-
chinery, buildings and intangible assets, can also shape the competitiveness of a location since 
R&D is often associated with production and technical assignments. Therefore, we also test 
whether the determination of the tax base has an effect. For this purpose, we use the effective 
average tax rate (EATR) in a sensitivity analysis. We also use EATR (Intangibles), which is 
calculated specifically for an investment into intangible assets like patents (Source for both 
EATR: Devereux et al. (2009)).25 Both EATRs provide a measure accounting for tax account-
ing rules, such as capital allowances, in addition to the tax rate. Both apply a weighted aver-
age for financing: retained earnings, debt and new equity.26 The B-Index assumes self-
financing. Correlations between EATR and the B-Index (0.31) and EATR (Intangibles) and 
the B-Index (0.40) are thus stronger. Therefore, the combined statutory corporate income tax 
rate seems to be the preferable measure in combination with the B-Index and we use EATR 
and EATR (Intangibles) only for a sensitivity analysis. 
2.3 Firm- and Country-Specific Control Variables 
We include year-dummies to cover technological and global changes. Firm-specific parame-
ters like the available workforce are important control variables. Thus, we use the firm-year-
specific number of employees (in natural logarithm = log) and the amount of total assets (in 
log) from the balance sheet to cover effects from size and capital intensity.27 Furthermore, we 
add GDP per capita as a control for living standard, market size and cost effects (Lederman 
and Maloney (2003)).28 We include the number of students enrolled in tertiary education 
                                                 
25  We refer to Devereux and Griffith (1999) and Devereux and Griffith (2003) for the definition of the EATR. 
26  The means of both EATRs are lower compared to the statutory corporate income tax rates as debt financing 
are generates deductible expenses. The level of the shareholder is neglected. 
27  We complete the number of employees and total assets in some cases with the respective numbers from the 
consolidated account of the firm to obtain a larger sample. We do that only if the firm-specific numbers in the 
Amadeus-database are not recorded for the whole period and if the firm is also equal to the parent company of 
the group according to the recorded global ultimate owner in Amadeus. 
28  Sources: GDP per capita: Eurostat, GDP at market prices / Hourly Compensation Costs: Bureau of Labor 
Statistics at the Department of Labor, International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation Costs in Manufactur-
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(Bebczuk (2002)) and divide it by population to measure effects from available human capi-
tal. Public R&D staff per capita represents the sum of full time equivalents for personnel en-
gaged in R&D in the public sector of the host country (Cantwell and Piscitello (2005)) divid-
ed by population. The strength of patent protection differs across countries and can affect the 
location decision. We therefore add an index called Ginarte-Park for patent protection, which 
we find in Park (2008) and which is scaled from 0 (low protection) to 5 (high protection) 
(Kumar (1996); Ginarte and Park (1997)). As the index is only available quinquennially, we 
assume that the index changes at the beginning of each five-year period in 1995, 2000, 2005. 
We also use a variable covering the openness of a country in successfully trading with the rest 
of the world to capture possible relations between innovation and trade performance (Wakelin 
(1998)). We calculate openness as imports and exports in goods divided by GDP. We use the 
share of high-tech exports as a measure to capture effects from trade and innovation, consist-
ing of exports in the so-defined high-tech sectors aircraft and spacecraft, radio, television and 
communication, office, accounting and computing machinery, pharmaceuticals and medical, 
and precision and optical instruments divided by GDP. 
3 Estimation Analysis 
We analyse the impact of relevant parameters on the patenting behaviour29, but we are mainly 
interested in the effects of the tax variables. There are two reasons to further refine our analy-
sis: First, the innovation process is characterised by nonlinearities as the first innovation is 
possibly more complex than the following ones (Crepon and Duguet (1997): 360). Second, 
the theory on international capital formation separates investment decisions into a discrete 
location choice (extensive margin) and the choice of investment volume (intensive margin) 
(See Keuschnigg (2007) for a discussion of tax effects). Along the lines of that split, we as-
sume that intellectual capital formation with the underlying R&D activity and intellectual cap-
ital production can also be regarded as providing a discrete investment choice (or extensive 
margin) and a choice of investment volume (or intensive margin). Hence, we assume two de-
cision problems: First, the discrete investment choice for R&D and intellectual capital is rep-
resented by the binary choice of the firm to invest in R&D and is measured using a variable 
indicating if the firm applies for a patent or not. Firms are only included if they applied at 
least once between 1995 and 2007. Second, the choice of the investment volume in R&D and 
intellectual capital is represented by the count of applications as dependent variable. 
                                                                                                                                                        
ing, converted to Euro / Number of students enrolled in tertiary education: OECD, Students enrolled by type of 
institution / Public R&D staff per capita: Source for public R&D staff: OECD, MEI, Total Business Enterprise 
R&D personnel (FTE); OECD, R&D personnel by sector of employment and field of science, government sector 
(FTE)) / Openness: Source for Imports and Exports: OECD, STAN Imports - Exports of Goods / High-tech ex-
ports: Source for exports in high-tech sectors: OECD, MSTI. 
29  However, there are some inventions like process innovations that might better be kept secret instead of apply-
ing for a patent. Also, software can not be patented in Europe. Our results are therefore valid for industries with 
patentable inventions. 
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3.1 Model 
According to the above proposed split, we first analyse the binary choice whether to invest in 
R&D or not and, as a result, the location of IP in a specific firm. Choosing a specific firm to 
invest in R&D and, consequently, to become the entity which files the application also deter-
mines the country and the country-specific (tax) parameters. We apply a logit model to model 
the probability of observing an application of the firm in a year, conditional on the observed 
frequency of the firm’s applications in all years (Chamberlain (1984); Buettner and Ruf 
(2007)).30 Our dependent variable for the regression is zero if the firm’s count of patent appli-
cations in the year equals zero and one otherwise. 
The second analysis is based on the count of applications of the specific firm per year. 
The dependent variable displays the characteristics of count data as there are no negative 
numbers and larger numbers are rare. The mean of the count of applications is below its un-
conditional variance. We also find a reasonable amount of zeros31, which is a common charac-
teristic of such count data and indicates overdispersion.32 A negative binomial (NB) model 
relaxes the assumption of equidispersion and allows variance and mean to differ, thereby be-
ing an appropriate model to account for overdispersion (Baltagi (2001): 336; Cameron and 
Trivedi (2010): 641). Negative binomial models originated from analyses of patenting behav-
iour (Hausman et al. (1984); Crepon and Duguet (1997); Cameron and Trivedi (2001): 337; 
Cantwell and Piscitello (2005)). Like other studies, we apply a negative binomial (II) model 
which assumes a quadratic variance function (Var(y|x)=E(y|x)+α²*E(y|x)). It also accounts for 
unobserved firm-specific effects and, thus, captures differences among firms in the patenting 
decision (Crepon and Duguet (1997)), which may stem from technological opportunities or 
special know-how. Negative binomial models also avoid problems with cluster-robustness 
(Cameron and Trivedi (2010): 641). 
We use panel models with fixed-effects specifications at the firm level to overcome 
problems with country and firm-specific unobservable effects as the patenting process can be 
affected by country-specific effects, for example public infrastructure, and by firm-specific 
effects, for example the quality of management. The level of taxation is usually positively 
correlated with the level of public services but it is difficult to observe quality and quantity of 
                                                 
30  The analysis explains the patent location decision where it is subject to some variation over time and not de-
termined beforehand (firm-fixed). The fixed-effect specification of the logit model drops the firm from the anal-
ysis if the firm-fixed effect is paramount in a way that all binary decisions between 1998 and 2007 are either yes 
or no (equal zero or one). 
31  The share of observed zeros in the basic sample is 61% and comparable to other publications on patents (60% 
in Bound et al. (1984); 73% in Crepon and Duguet (1997)). 
32  Overdispersion can, among other reasons, occur if the process responsible for the first patent application is 
different from the process for further applications (see Baltagi (2001), p. 337). In order to test for overdispersion, 
we apply a likelihood ratio test as applied in Stata Library online, “Analyzing Count Data”. The α - coefficient in 
the variance function is significantly different from zero, indicating overdispersion. We additionally test the null 
hypothesis of equidispersion based on the variance function of a negative binomial (II) model using a t-test (see 
Cameron and Trivedi (2010), p. 575) and the outcome also indicates overdispersion. 
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public infrastructure (Bartik (1991); Phillips and Goss (1995)), for example public R&D. Un-
observable characteristics of the firm, such as innovativeness and strategic patenting, deter-
mine the firm’s propensity to patent and are difficult to observe as well (Scherer (1983)). The 
fixed-effects specification captures time-invariant firm-characteristics, like industry or degree 
of technological capabilities.33 It also relaxes the assumption of independence and allows for 
correlation between taxes, tax incentives for R&D and other variables (Mundlak (1978); Ex-
amples are Buettner and Ruf (2007) and Karkinsky and Riedel (2009)).34 
In our estimation strategy, we therefore first apply a logit model. Second, we exclude 
zero-observations and run a negative binomial (II) hurdle model restricted (truncated) to ob-
servations larger than zero (see for example Cameron and Trivedi (2010): 583 f.) to further 
analyse the count of applications. Third, we include the zero-observations again and run the 
negative binomial (II) model on the whole sample with all observations. 
3.2 Results 
According to our estimation strategy outlined in the beginning of chapter 3 and 3.1, we treat 
the application as a binary choice to locate R&D and IP ownership in a specific firm in a first 
step and run a logit model with firm-fixed effects. The model in specification 1 in Table 3 con-
tains a reduced set and the model in specification 2 contains a basic set of control variables. 
Focusing on the tax variables, we find a significant negative effect of the B-Index in both 
specifications. This reveals the expected negative effect of the R&D user cost on patenting 
and indicates, according to our assumptions, a positive effect of R&D tax incentives on R&D 
investment. Quantitatively, a decrease of the B-Index by one percentage point would increase 
the odds ratio by 0.011 according to our estimates (marginal effect -1.1, evaluated at the mean 
of all variables), which translates in a 11% increase of that odds ratio for a ten percentage 
point decrease of the B-Index. Such a decrease can be achieved, for example, by the introduc-
tion of a tax credit of 10% on all R&D expenditures. The odds ratio is the ratio of the proba-
bility to observe a patent application divided by the probability to observe no application. The 
combined statutory corporate income tax rate shows the assumed negative impact in specifi-
cation 1 and a positive impact in specification 2, but is not significant in both cases.35 
                                                 
33  Patent indicators also have some disadvantages (e.g. Pavitt (1985)). There are different propensities to patent 
across industries. Potential applicants might also prefer secrecy or lead time over patenting (Cohen et al. (2000)). 
This is of minor importance to our analysis as we control for firm-fixed-effects and capture time-fixed behaviour 
in our following analysis.  
34  Hausman-tests confirm the use of fixed-effects specifications for logit and NB (II). We also include year 
dummies to control for year-specific effects and we include the relevant variables to control for time-variant 
country-specific effects. We do not observe firms moving from one location to another and, thus, refrain from 
also controlling for location-specific fixed-effects besides firm-specific fixed-effects as this would drop the tax 
variables from the regression. 
35  Focusing on the control variables, we find that the firm-specific number of employees and the total assets 
show a reasonable, significant and positive effect in both logit specifications (1 and 2). The number of employ-
ees and total assets reflect the potential to develop and generate intellectual capital. Ginarte-Park reflects the 
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Table 3: Main regression results. 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Model LOGIT LOGIT NB(II) NB(II) NB(II) NB(II) NB(II) 
Fixed-effects? fixed-effects fixed-effects fixed-effects fixed-effects fixed-effects fixed-effects fixed-effects 
Dependent Variable Patent applica-tion: yes/no 
Patent applica-
tion: yes/no 
Count of ap-
plications 
Count of ap-
plications  
Count of ap-
plications 
Count of ap-
plications 
Count of ap-
plications 
 # App. > 0  
Comb. Corp. Stat. Tax Rate -0.224 0.653 -0.844*** -0.744*** -0.862*** 
(0.594) (0.662) (0.241) (0.203) (0.235) 
EATR    -0.268 
   (0.367) 
EATR (Intangibles)    0.361 
   (0.360) 
B-Index (Large) -1.184*** -1.070*** -0.0560 0.517*** 0.192 0.200 0.256* 
(0.311) (0.324) (0.157) (0.135) (0.143) (0.145) (0.147) 
Log. GDP p. capita -1.700*** -1.895*** -0.0925 -0.221** -0.228** -0.322*** -0.346*** 
(0.365) (0.391) (0.141) (0.106) (0.113) (0.111) (0.109) 
Public R&D staff p. capita 792.3*** -16.86  267.7*** 257.0*** 232.2*** 
(171.9) (66.47)  (58.51) (60.24) (59.96) 
Students p. capita  -13.15 -4.729  -16.27*** -14.15*** -12.57*** 
(Tert. edu.) (8.315) (3.191)  (2.854) (2.922) (2.876) 
Ginarte-Park 0.424** 0.281***  0.316*** 0.407*** 0.420*** 
(0.173) (0.0938)  (0.0854) (0.0814) (0.0818) 
Openness 0.237 0.0877  0.228** 0.187* 0.196* 
(0.319) (0.122)  (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
High-Tech export share -0.0624 -1.618**  -0.403 0.151 0.426 
(1.940) (0.818)  (0.751) (0.755) (0.736) 
Governments  -161.7* 1.757  -89.78*** -79.77** -61.50* 
funding on BERD (83.55) (36.79)  (34.24) (35.42) (35.60) 
Log. Employees 0.0673*** 0.0627*** -0.00269 0.0494*** 0.0471*** 0.0461*** 0.0455*** 
(0.0189) (0.0189) (0.00762) (0.00834) (0.00831) (0.00829) (0.00828) 
Log. Total Assets 0.0765*** 0.0757*** -0.0667*** 0.0116 0.00710 0.00634 0.00564 
(0.0225) (0.0226) (0.00810) (0.00866) (0.00860) (0.00859) (0.00857) 
Log likelyhood 74,362 74,362 24,419 80,484 80,484 80,484 80,484 
Observations -25,212 -25,190 -30,180 -58,595 -58,549 -58,555 -58,555 
Number of panel_id 12,191 12,191 6,823 13,512 13,512 13,512 13,512 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). ²The NB (II) model accounts for overdispersion 
and is close to cluster-robust estimation (see Cameron/Trivedi 2010, p. 641). “Log” indicates natural logarithm. Time con-
trols (Year dummy) included. "Observations" indicates firm-year observations of the count of applications per year. "Number 
of panel_id" indicates the number of different firms that are observed in the panel over several years, each panel_id thus can 
represent up to 10 "observations". 
In the second step, we separate the decision to apply for a patent (yes/no) and the in-
tensive decision (count of applications) to allow that the zeros and non-zeros are determined 
by different underlying economic processes. Therefore, we compute a logit model equal to 
specification 2 in Table 3, like already discussed above. We then use a negative binomial (II) 
model which we restrict to count-observations larger than zero (Table 3, specification 3). The 
NB (II) model is, thus, truncated at zero and we can analyse the factors which determine the 
count of patent applications given that the firm had at least one application in that year. In 
specification 3, we find no significant effect of the B-Index. The fact that the B-Index is sig-
nificant for the binary decision (specification 2) but not for the intensive decision (count 
                                                                                                                                                        
strength of patent protection and it reveals a reasonable significant positive impact on patenting. Furthermore, 
Public R&D staff reveals a significant positive effect which is intuitive as public institutions provide important 
infrastructure. GDP per capita shows a significant negative effect in both logit specifications as it captures 
wealth effects and the market attractiveness but also costs for labour inputs and, thus, could capture unfavourable 
cost effects. Other variables (Openness, High-Tech export) are insignificant. Students per capita and the gov-
ernment’s funding on BERD show significant negative effects. An explanation could be the frequently high se-
lectivity of direct governmental subsidies for R&D projects with subsequent crowding out of unfortunate appli-
cants for direct grants. 
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number, specification 3) could be explained by the thresholds for benefits from R&D tax in-
centives (as discussed in chapter 2.2.). Incentives might become irrelevant for larger firms as 
they exceed the thresholds with their R&D budgets. Furthermore, tax incentives could in-
crease the probability of smaller firms to do continuous R&D, whereas larger firms have 
enough funds. This might rather increase the ability of smaller firms to overcome the obsta-
cles to innovation and it might thus increase the number of firms which continuously invest in 
R&D. Moreover, the link between the scale of R&D tax subsidies and the scale of patent out-
put might be less resilient than expected. 
In addition, we find a significant negative effect of the combined statutory corporate 
income tax rate on the number of applications in specification 3. The observed negative effect 
is in line with our expectations in chapter 1. It can be explained by decreased real R&D activi-
ty as the country becomes less attractive to locate R&D projects after considering taxation of 
the resulting IP. A higher tax rate makes it more attractive to relocate R&D activity to other 
countries with lower tax rates in the course of tax planning with R&D phase and IP phase. 
Furthermore, tax-efficient behaviour, for example by using secrecy instead of patenting or by 
deferring patent applications could be reasons. We find a marginal effect of -0.8, which means 
that the average number of applications increases by 0.08 for a ten percentage point decrease 
of the tax rate. 
3.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
We now abandon the separate analysis of extensive and intensive decision and apply the 
negative binomial (II) model to the whole sample, which means to all observations regardless 
if the firms apply for zero or more patents (Table 3, specifications 4, 5, 6 and 7). We find a 
significant positive effect of the B-Index on the count of applications for the reduced set of 
variables (specification 4), which is unexpected but might again be explained by thresholds 
for R&D tax incentives and by important control variables that are not in the reduced set of 
variables.36 Yet, the B-Index is not significant anymore in specification 5 with all control vari-
ables included. We find a significant negative effect of the combined statutory corporate in-
come tax rate in this specification with a marginal effect of -0.9, which translates in an in-
crease of the average count of applications by 0.09 for a ten percentage point decrease of the 
tax rate. 
Several sensitivity analyses further account for alternative tax variables and for struc-
tural heterogeneity among the patenting firms. First, we use EATR and EATR (Intangibles) 
as alternative tax measures for the tax burden in the IP ownership phase (Table 3, specifica-
tion 6 and 7). The EATR displays negative effects and the EATR (Intangibles) displays a pos-
                                                 
36  Table 3 also contains a NB (II) model with the reduced set of variables as a robustness check (specification 
2). The corporate income tax rate is insignificant in this reduced model as well as total assets. Yet, the B-Index 
and employees display significantly positive effects. 
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itive effect, but both are insignificant. The log likelyhood indicates that the EATR and the 
EATR (Intangibles) provide a worse fit of the model compared to the combined statutory cor-
porate income tax rate. Both measures assume a mixture of three ways of financing. The as-
sumed financing mix might fail to reproduce the real financing pattern of the firms. Thus, we 
prefer the combined statutory corporate income tax rate as measure for the tax burden. 
Second, we exclude countries having no R&D tax incentive (for the years 1998 to 
2007). Those countries are Germany, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Slovakia and Norway (see 
also Table A-3).37 The results (in Table 4, specification 1) reveal a significant negative impact 
of the B-Index. The negative effect of the B-Index is significant in contrast to specification 5 
in Table 3. We measure a marginal effect of -0.5, which translates into an increase of the av-
erage count of patents by 0.05 for a ten percentage point decrease of the B-Index. We also 
find a significant negative effect of the corporate income tax rate. The marginal effect is -2.3, 
which translates in an increase of the average count of applications by 0.23 for a decrease of 
the tax rate by ten percentage points. The fact that the B-Index and the corporate income tax 
rate proof highly significant and that the marginal effect for the tax rate is 156% higher com-
pared to the full set of countries might be explained by different country-specific behaviour. 
Firms in countries with tax incentives seem to be more sensitive to the tax burden and react 
rather elastic on changes in taxation. Also, lawyers and tax advisors might be more familiar 
with the interactions between taxation and innovation in those countries. 
Third, we check whether firms react differently if the invention was made in coopera-
tion with inventors from foreign countries, for example if a German firm applies for a patent 
and there is a German and an Austrian inventor. We therefore keep applications with at least 
one foreign inventor and exclude applications that have solely domestic inventors (specifica-
tions 2 and 3 in Table 4). Those applications reflect that the physical R&D activity is partly 
done in a foreign location. We find no significant effect for the B-Index in the logit model 
(specification 2) and in the negative binomial (II) model (specification 3). Tax planning in the 
R&D phase with R&D incentives across borders by using contract R&D might still be un-
common as they emerged in the recent past. Furthermore, the legislation of the European 
Court of Justice (see footnote 18), which broadened the definition of eligible contract R&D to 
include cross-border R&D, is only about five years young. Therefore, contract R&D might 
not yet play a big role for these cross-border cooperations. However, we find a significant 
negative effect of the corporate income tax rate in the logit model with a marginal effect of -
2.4 on the odds ratio. There is also a significant negative effect in the negative binomial (II) 
                                                 
37  The R&D tax incentive must be accessible in general to all firms and it must be directed to R&D inputs. 
Denmark had an allowance of 150% between 2002 and 2006. Yet, it was limited to contract R&D expenditures 
to public research institutions and we, therefore, disregard this quite specific incentive. Norway provides a tax 
credit for R&D at 20% since 2002 (“SkatteFUNN”). However, limitations restricted the credit to SME-
companies without group-affiliation and we thus excluded the incentive from our survey. 
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model with a marginal effect of -2.0 which is 120% larger than for the full sample (specifica-
tion 5 in Table 3). Such line-ups across borders might provide better opportunities for tax-
effcient structuring of the IP phase, for example by using purchase of ready-made IP or by 
shifting know-how (see discussion in 1.1.). It seems to be possible for low-tax countries to 
attract the location of patents although the R&D activity was done in a foreign location. From 
a fiscal point of view this is interesting as those attracted intellectual assets also increase the 
taxable income and accordingly the fiscal tax revenue of that country. For innovation policy, 
it would be preferable also to attract the R&D activity itself. 
Table 4: Results for sensitivity analyses. 
Specification 1 2 3 4 5 
Model NB(II) LOGIT NB(II) NB(II) NB(II) 
Fixed-effects? fixed-effects fixed-effects fixed-effects fixed-effects fixed-effects 
Dependent Variable Count of applica-tions 
Applic. with foreign 
inventor: yes/no  
Count of applica-
tions with foreign 
inventor 
Count of applications 
where #employees > 
5,000 
Count of applications
where #employees > 
10,000 
Comb. Corp. Stat. Tax Rate -2.331*** -2.392* -2.028*** -2.585*** -2.654*** 
(0.489) (1.224) (0.602) (0.594) (0.696) 
B-Index (Large) -0.543*** -0.137 0.535 0.655* 0.485 
(0.207) (0.809) (0.467) (0.368) (0.392) 
Log. GDP p. capita 0.0787 -1.232 -0.399 0.296 0.454 
(0.129) (0.818) (0.403) (0.299) (0.358) 
Public R&D staff p. capita 51.96 456.8 146.6 418.9*** 481.7*** 
(122.1) (350.1) (179.5) (156.8) (182.8) 
Students p. capita  -21.36*** 1.327 2.225 -20.64*** -29.88*** 
(Tert. edu.) (6.857) (19.09) (9.558) (6.672) (7.133) 
Ginarte-Park 0.547*** 0.0877 0.0567 0.784*** 0.644** 
(0.103) (0.384) (0.262) (0.237) (0.267) 
Openness 0.305*** -0.0253 0.275 0.613 0.902** 
(0.113) (0.609) (0.223) (0.389) (0.422) 
High-Tech export share -2.194** -3.392 -2.910* -6.058*** -6.479** 
(0.865) (3.864) (1.578) (2.349) (2.545) 
Governments  -132.9*** 335.4* 233.0** -41.13 61.64 
funding on BERD (49.79) (173.3) (99.24) (89.02) (107.2) 
Log. Employees 0.0396*** 0.0524 0.0639*** 0.0644** 0.0307 
(0.0106) (0.0368) (0.0182) (0.0300) (0.0304) 
Log. Total Assets 0.00906 0.166*** 0.0852*** -0.00458 0.0174 
(0.0106) (0.0448) (0.0212) (0.0280) (0.0291) 
Log likelyhood 59,189 14,118 1,4751 9,100 8,477 
Observations -40,935 -4,755 -8,307 -9,328 -8,172 
Number of panel_id 9,282 2,127 2,253 1,781 1,689 
Notes: See notes below Table 3. Specification 1: Countries without R&D tax incentives (DE, DK, FI, SE, SK, NO) excluded 
/ Specifications 2-3: Only applications with at least one foreign inventor / Specifications 4-5: Only applicants with more than 
5,000 employees (specification 4) and more than 10,000 employees (specification 5). 
Fourth, we test whether large firms with many employees (specification 4) react dif-
ferently. We find an unexpected positive effect of the B-Index, which is significant at a low 
level (at 10%), for firms larger than 5,000 employees. However, the effect turns out to be in-
significant for firms with more than 10,000 employees (specification 5). Nonetheless, the cor-
porate income tax rate reveals a significantly negative impact with a marginal effect of -2.6 
for firms larger than 5,000 employees. That effect is 189% larger than for the whole sample 
(Table 3, specification 5). The marginal effect for firms with more than 10,000 employees 
(specification 5) is 200% above the whole sample. Larger firms could be more sensitive to 
issues of taxation and react more elastic. Moreover, tax planning could be more rewarding for 
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larger firms as it needs a certain degree of know-how and a certain size to have the opportuni-
ty to behave tax-efficient. Larger firms have more options and more available locations in dif-
ferent countries to structure R&D phase and IP phase with regard to the overall tax burden.38  
Our results compare well with the results in other studies. Parsons and Phillips (2007) 
report an R&D-elasticity of -1.2% for the user cost of R&D. We find a similar (converted) 
elasticity of -1.1% for the B-Index (specification 2, Table 3). Karkinsky and Riedel (2009) 
report a semi-elasticity of -2.9% on patenting for a decrease of one percentage point of the 
corporate income tax rate. This effect is larger than our converted semi-elasticity of -1.9% 
(specification 5, Table 3) but can be explained by the different sample (larger firms, patent 
count cut off at 20 applications p.a., different time period).  
4 Conclusions 
We compare tax subsidies for inputs in the R&D process and find an increasing level of tax 
incentives from 1998 to 2007. We use micro-level patent data of European corporations from 
the EPO for an empirical analysis of tax effects on the R&D phase and on the IP phase. 
We find positive effects of R&D tax incentives on the probability to invest in R&D in 
the R&D phase. The marginal effect is a 11% increase of the odds ratio for a ten percentage 
point decrease of the B-Index equaling the introduction of a 10% tax credit on R&D expendi-
tures. R&D tax incentives seem to increase the probability of smaller firms to start investing 
in R&D. We also measure an increase of the average count of patents by 0.05 for a ten per-
centage point decrease of the B-Index in countries with R&D tax incentives. The statistical 
robustness for the B-Index in the empirical analysis beside those results is not very pro-
nounced and may be explained by thresholds that limit the benefits from R&D tax incentives 
for larger firms in many countries. 
We find a negative effect of the combined statutory corporate income tax rate on the 
IP phase and the intensive decision which we measured with the count of patent applications. 
The marginal effect is estimated as an increase of the average count of applications by 0.09 
for a decrease of the corporate income tax rate of ten percentage points. The effect in coun-
tries with R&D tax incentives is 156% larger indicating a stronger sensitivity to tax issues. 
Firms, lawyers and tax advisors might be more familiar with the interactions between taxation 
and innovation in those countries. 
The effect of the corporate income tax rate is 120% larger for inventions that were de-
veloped in cooperation with foreign inventors. Those cooperations seem to provide better op-
portunities for tax planning with IP ownership in the IP phase. It seems to be possible for low-
                                                 
38  We also run an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with fixed-effects (Appendix, Table A-1) to check 
the robustness of our estimations. OLS is not our favourite model as it does not account for the count number 
properties of the data. Nevertheless, those estimations do not contradict our results. The B-Index displays nega-
tive effects (in specifications 1, 2, 3) but is insignificant.The corporate income tax rate as well as EATR (Intan-
gibles) also indicate negative effects but are insignificant. 
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tax countries to attract the location of patents although the R&D activity was done in a foreign 
location. The corporate income tax rate seems to be important for those cross-border coopera-
tions. However, it would be preferable from an innovation-policy perspective to host the 
physical R&D activity itself and not only the resulting intellectual property.  
Moreover, we find a marginal effect which is about 189% higher for firms with more 
than 5,000 employees. Larger firms have more options and more available locations in differ-
ent countries to structure R&D phase and IP phase tax-efficiently with regard to the overall 
tax burden. The corporate income tax rate seems to be especially important for large firms. 
The results show that channels exist where fiscal policy and innovation policy can in-
teract. A fiscal instrument to foster R&D activity in the own country could be the use of R&D 
tax incentives, which we found to have a positive effect on the probability to invest in R&D 
for smaller firms. Another option would be to lower the corporate income tax rate which we 
found to increase patent applications and, indirectly, also earlier R&D investments in that 
specific country. A lower corporate income tax rate also seems to attract the location of pa-
tents that were developed in cooperation with foreign inventors which increases the fiscal tax 
base and the fiscal revenue of the host country. 
 Appendix 
Table A-1: OLS-Models, panel with fixed-effects. 
Specification 1 2 3 
Model OLS³ OLS³ OLS³ 
Fixed-effects? fixed-effects fixed-effects fixed-effects 
Dependent Variable Log (Count of application) Log (Count of application) Log (Count of application) 
Comb. Corp. Stat. Tax Rate -0.0562 
(0.323) 
EATR 0.0779 
(0.530) 
EATR (Intangibles) -0.108 
(0.484) 
B-Index (Large) -0.135 -0.133 -0.138 
(0.181) (0.181) (0.182) 
Log. GDP p. capita 0.144 0.118 0.143 
(0.239) (0.236) (0.233) 
Public R&D staff p. capita 67.27 67.68 70.57 
(98.88) (98.77) (98.48) 
Students p. capita (Tert. edu.) -10.41** -10.42** -10.56** 
(4.404) (4.454) (4.457) 
Ginarte-Park 0.193* 0.194* 0.198* 
(0.109) (0.113) (0.112) 
Openness 0.259 0.271 0.252 
(0.170) (0.179) (0.176) 
High-Tech export share -1.222 -1.200 -1.223 
(1.068) (1.068) (1.068) 
Governments funding on BERD 14.33 18.04 10.58 
(44.14) (48.01) (47.83) 
Log. Employees 0.0204* 0.0204* 0.0203* 
(0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0115) 
Log. Total Assets 0.0390*** 0.0391*** 0.0390*** 
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121) 
R-squared 32,192 32,192 32,192 
Observations 0.017 0.017 0.017 
Number of panel_id 14,596 14,596 14,596 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). ³Robust standard errors. Time controls (Year dummy) included. Only applicants with at least one application between 
1998 and 2007 are included. 
 
 Table A-2: Calculation of B-Index. 
B is defined as 1
1
Z*tB
t
   where 1( Z * t )  is the after-tax cost of a €1 expenditure in R&D 
and t is the combined statutory corporate income tax rate. 1( Z * t )  is the net present value of 
investments in R&D after taxes. It covers tax treatment of input factors in the R&D process. 
The value of Z can be decomposed into dZ  (net present value of depreciation), taZ  (net pre-
sent value of special R&D tax allowances) and cZ  (net present value of R&D tax credits). 
The different inputs into R&D form together 100%. The assuemd shares are 60% for labour, 
30% for current costs and 10% for capital expenditures for machinery (5%) and buildings 
(5%). dd  is the share of expenditures treated with a certain depreciation; tad  is the share of 
expenditures subject to an extra tax allowance for R&D and cd  is the share of expenditures 
subject to an R&D tax credit. Z can be written as a composition of dZ , taZ and cZ : 
d d ta ta c c creditrateZ d * Z d * Z d * Z * t   . If no tax allowances or credits are available except usual 
depreciation, Z simplifies to dZ . 
Yet, there are n different inputs (labour, other current and capital (machinery, buildings)) 
which enter the R&D process with their specific shares ns  (0.6 / 0.3 / 0.1). B can therefore be 
expressed as: 
1
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. 
If there is no specific R&D tax incentive, sZ and ocZ for staff and other current expenditures 
will usually equal one as those expenditures are deductible in the same year. mZ (machinery) 
and bZ  (buildings) cover tax depreciation for capital assets and depend on the kind of depre-
ciation, the time to depreciate or the depreciation rate. If all R&D expenditures except build-
ings are deductible in the current year, then B simplifies to 0 95 1 0 05 1
1
b( . * ( t ) . * ( Z * t ))B
( t )
    . If 
there was an extra allowance allowanceratea  for wages and current expenditures, it would read as 
0 90 1 1 0 05 1 0 05 1
1
ta m b( . * ( ( d a )t ) . * ( Z * t ) . * ( Z * t ))B
( t )
        when a  is the allowance rate. In case 
of a non-taxable tax credit creditratet  , it would read 
0 90 1 0 05 1 0 05 1
1
c creditrate m b( . * ( d t t ) . * ( Z * t ) . * ( Z * t ))B
( t )
       . The calculation assumes 100% self-
financing. Warda (Warda (2001)) lists several amendments for the calculation of Z to ac-
count for tax credits, depreciation and allowances. For the underlying methodology see 
McFetridge and Warda (1983b), Warda (1990), OECD (2005); Guellec and van Pottels-
berghe de la Potterie (2003). 
 
 Table A-3: Details on R&D tax incentives and B-Index for 1998 to 2007. 
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AT 1998-1999 0.928 34.00 SL 14.3% SL 4.0% No Tax all. Curr. & Cap. 18.0%  Tax all. 9% (Cap. (except building)) 
AT 2000 0.892 34.00 SL 14.3% SL 4.0% No Tax all. Curr. & Cap. 25.0% 35.0% Tax all. 9% (Cap. (except building)) 
AT 2001-2003 0.894 34.00 SL 14.3% SL (7%;3%;3%...) No Tax all. Curr. & Cap. 25.0% 35.0%   
AT 2004 0.895 34.00 SL 14.3% SL 3.0% No Tax all. Curr. & Cap. 25.0% 35.0%   
AT 2005-2007 0.909 25.00 SL 14.3% SL 3.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. 8.0%    
BE 1998-2002 1.010 40.17 SL 33.33% (for R&D assets) DB (DB 10%, switch to SL at 5%) No Tax all. Cap. 13.5%    
BE 2003 1.007 33.99 SL 33.33% (for R&D assets) DB (DB 10%, switch to SL at 5%) No Tax all. Cap. 13.5%  Tax cr. 25% (R&D staff wage with-
holding tax) 
BE 2004-2005 0.969 33.99 SL 33.33% (for R&D assets) DB (DB 10%, switch to SL at 5%) No Tax all. Cap. 13.5%  Tax cr. 25% (R&D staff wage with-
holding tax) 
BE 2006-2007 0.968 33.99 SL 33.33% (for R&D assets) DB (DB 10%, switch to SL at 5%) No Tax all. Cap. 14.5%  Tax cr. 25% (R&D staff wage with-
holding tax) 
CZ 1998 1.022 35.00 Digi. 6 years Digi. 45 years No        
CZ 1999 1.019 35.00 Digi. 6 years Digi. 30 years No        
CZ 2000-2003 1.013 31.00 Digi. 6 years Digi. 30 years No Tax all. Cap. (machinery)  10.0%   
CZ 2004 1.012 28.00 Digi. 6 years Digi. 30 years No Tax all. Cap. (machinery)  10.0%   
CZ 2005 0.696 26.00 Digi. 6 years Digi. 30 years No Tax all. Curr.  200.0%   
CZ 2006-2007 0.727 24.00 Digi. 6 years Digi. 30 years No Tax all. Curr.  200.0%   
DE 1998 1.039 56.52 DB (DB30%;SL 8%) SL (10%,10%,10%,10%,5%,5%,5%,2,5
%,2,5%,….) 
No        
DE 1999-2000 1.042 52.35 DB (DB30%;SL 8%) SL 4.0% No        
DE 2001-2002 1.029 39.35 DB (DB20%, switch to SL 12.8%) SL 3.0% No        
DE 2003 1.031 40.66 DB (DB20%, switch to SL 12.8%) SL 3.0% No        
DE 2004-2005 1.029 39.35 DB (DB20%, switch to SL 12.8%) SL 3.0% No        
DE 2006-2007 1.027 39.35 DB (DB30%;SL 8%) SL 3.0% No        
DK 1998 1.018 34.00 DB 30.0% SL 5.0% No        
DK 1999 1.017 32.00 DB 30.0% Sl 5.0% No        
DK 2000 1.017 32.00 DB 30.0% SL 5.0% No        
DK 2001 1.016 30.00 DB 25.0% Sl 5.0% No        
DK 2002 1.016 30.00 DB 25.0% SL 5.0% No        
DK 2003 1.016 30.00 DB 25.0% SL 5.0% No        
DK 2004 1.016 30.00 DB 25.0% Sl 5.0% No        
DK 2005 1.015 28.00 DB 25.0% SL 5.0% No        
DK 2006 1.015 28.00 DB 25.0% Sl 5.0% No        
DK 2007 1.012 25.00 DB 25.0% SL 5.0% No        
ES 1998-1999 0.648 40.30 DB (DB 28.57%, switch to SL 8.68%) SL 3.0% No Tax cr. Curr. 20.0% 40.0%   
ES 2000-2001 0.477 40.30 DB (DB 28.57%, switch to SL 8.68%) SL 3.0% No Tax cr. Curr. 30.0% 50.0%   
ES 2002-2003 0.457 40.30 DB (DB 28.57%, switch to SL 8.68%) SL 3.0% No Tax cr. Curr. 30.0% 50.0% Tax cr. (R&D staff): 10% 
ES 2004-2006 0.428 40.30 DB (DB 28.57%, switch to SL 8.68%) SL 3.0% No Tax cr. Curr. 30.0% 50.0% Tax cr. (R&D staff): 20% / Tax cr. 
(machinery): 10% 
ES 2007 0.489 38.01 DB (DB 28.57%, switch to SL 8.68%) SL 3.0% No Tax cr. Curr.     
FI 1998 1.014 28.00 DB 30.0% DB 7.0% No        
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FI 1999 1.015 28.00 DB 25.0% DB 7.0% No        
FI 2000-2004 1.016 29.00 DB 25.0% DB 7.0% No        
FI 2005-2007 1.013 26.00 DB 25.0% DB 7.0% No        
FR 1998 0.923 41.67 DB (DB 35.71%, switch to SL 5.49%) SL 5.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. (no land)  50.0%   
FR 1999 0.923 40.00 DB (DB 35.71%, switch to SL 5.49%) SL 5.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. (no land)  50.0%   
FR 2000 0.925 37.76 DB (DB 35.71%, switch to SL 5.49%) SL 5.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. (no land)  50.0%   
FR 2001 0.926 36.43 DB (DB 32.14%, switch to SL 7.07%) SL 5.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. (no land)  50.0%   
FR 2002 0.926 35.43 DB (DB 32.14%, switch to SL 7.07%) SL 5.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. (no land)  50.0%   
FR 2003 0.926 35.43 DB (DB 32.14%, switch to SL 7.07%) SL 5.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. (no land)  50.0%   
FR 2004 0.859 35.43 DB (DB 32.14%, switch to SL 7.07%) SL 5.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. (no land) 5.0% 45.0%   
FR 2005 0.859 34.93 DB (DB 32.14%, switch to SL 7.07%) SL 5.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. (no land) 5.0% 45.0%   
FR 2006-2007 0.794 34.43 DB (DB 32.14%, switch to SL 7.07%) SL 5.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. (no land) 10.0% 40.0%   
GB 1998-2001 1.013 31.00 SL 100% (R&D assets) SL 4.0% No        
GB 2002-2007 0.916 30.00 SL 100% (R&D assets) SL 4.0% No Tax all. Curr. 125.0%    
GR 1998-2005 1.042 32.00 DB (DB 42.86%, switch to SL 10.7%) SL 8.0% Yes      
GR 2006 1.009 29.00 DB (DB 42.86%, switch to SL 10.7%) SL 8.0% Yes Tax all. Curr.  50.0%  
GR 2007 1.008 25.00 DB (DB 42.86%, switch to SL 10.7%) SL 8.0% Yes Tax all. Curr.  50.0%  
HU 1998 0.768 19.09 SL 14.5% SL 14.5% No Tax all. Curr. & Cap. (no land) 200.0%    
HU 1999 0.764 19.32 SL 14.5% SL 14.5% No Tax all. Curr. & Cap. (no land) 200.0%    
HU 2000-2002 0.761 19.55 SL 14.5% SL 14.5% No Tax all. Curr. & Cap. (no land) 200.0%    
HU 2003 0.758 19.55 SL 50.0% SL 14.5% No Tax all. Curr. & Cap. (no land) 200.0%    
HU 2004 0.788 17.60 SL 50.0% SL 14.5% No Tax all. Curr. & Cap. (no land) 200.0%    
HU 2005 0.722 17.52 SL 50.0% SL 2.0% No Tax all. Curr. & Cap. (no land) 200.0%  Tax cr. 10% (R&D wages) 
HU 2006 0.747 17.36 SL 50.0% SL 2.0% No Tax all. Curr. & Cap. (no land) 200.0%  Tax cr. 10% (R&D wages) 
HU 2007 0.690 21.36 SL 50.0% SL 2.0% No Tax all. Curr. & Cap. (no land) 200.0%  Tax cr. 10% (R&D wages) 
IE 1998-2000 1.005 10.00 SL 15.0% SL 4.0% No        
IE 2001 1.004 10.00 SL 20.0% SL 4.0% No        
IE 2002 1.003 10.00 SL 100%, if R&D cap. SL 4.0% No        
IE 2003 1.004 12.50 SL 100%, if R&D cap. SL 4.0% No        
IE 2004 0.974 12.50 SL 100&, if R&D cap. SL 4.0% No Tax cr. Curr. (Base 2003)  20.0% Tax cr. 20% (building) 
IE 2005 0.966 12.50 SL 100%, if R&D cap. SL 4.0% No Tax cr. Curr. (Base 2003)  20.0% Tax cr. 20% (building) 
IE 2006 0.958 12.50 SL 100%, if R&D cap. SL 4.0% No Tax cr. Curr. (Base 2003)  20.0% Tax cr. 20% (building) 
IE 2007 0.950 12.50 SL 100%, if R&D cap. SL 4.0% No Tax cr. Curr. (Base 2003)  20.0% Tax cr. 20% (building) 
IT 1998-2000 1.028 41.25 SL (12.5%;25%;12,%,...) SL (4%;8%;4,%,...) No        
IT 2001-2002 1.026 40.25 SL (12.5%;25%;12,%,...) SL (4%;8%;4,%,...) No        
IT 2003 1.024 38.25 SL (12.5%;25%;12,%,...) SL (4%;8%;4,%,...) No        
IT 2004-2006 0.935 37.25 SL (12.5%;25%;12,%,...) SL (4%;8%;4,%,...) No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap.  10.0%   
IT 2007 0.864 37.25 SL (12.5%;25%;12,%,...) SL (4%;8%;4,%,...) No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap.  10.0%   
LU 1998-2001 1.021 37.45 DB (DB 40%, switch to SL 8% / for 
R&D) 
SL 4.0%       
LU 2002-2005 1.016 30.38 DB (DB 40%, switch to SL 8% / for 
R&D) 
SL 4.0%       
LU 2006-2007 1.015 29.63 DB (DB 40%, switch to SL 8% / for 
R&D) 
SL 4.0%       
NL 1998 0.921 35.00 SL 14.3% SL 2.5% No Tax cr. Wages 17.5%    
NL 1999-2001 0.948 35.00 SL 14.3% SL 2.5% No Tax cr. Wages 13.0%    
NL 2002-2003 0.947 34.50 SL 14.3% SL 2.5% No Tax cr. Wages 13.0%    
NL 2004 0.941 34.50 SL 14.3% SL 2.5% No Tax cr. Wages 14.0%    
NL 2005 0.938 31.50 SL 14.3% SL 2.5% No Tax cr. Wages 14.0%    
NL 2006 0.936 29.60 SL 14.3% SL 2.5% No Tax cr. Wages 14.0%    
NL 2007 0.933 25.50 SL 14.3% SL 2.5% No Tax cr. Wages 14.0%    
NO 1998-1999 1.041 28.00 DB 20.0% DB 5.0% Yes        
NO 2000 1.042 28.00 DB 20.0% DB 4.0% Yes        
NO 2001 1.044 28.00 DB 15.0% DB 2.0% Yes        
NO 2002-2005 1.042 28.00 DB 15.0% DB 4.0% Yes        
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NO 2006-2007 1.042 28.00 DB 20.0% DB 4.0% Yes        
PL 1998 1.057 36.00 SL 1 (for R&D) SL 2.5% Yes        
PL 1999 1.052 34.00 SL 1 (for R&D) SL 2.5% Yes        
PL 2000 1.043 30.00 SL 1 (for R&D) SL 2.5% Yes        
PL 2001 1.037 28.00 SL 1 (for R&D) SL 2.5% Yes        
PL 2002 1.038 28.00 SL (0.2,0.1,0.1,…) SL 2.5% Yes        
PL 2003 1.036 27.00 SL (0.3,0.1,0.1,…) SL 2.5% Yes        
PL 2004-2005 1.023 19.00 SL (0.3,0.1,0.1,…) SL 2.5% Yes        
PL 2006-2007 1.020 19.00 SL (0.3,0.1,0.1,…) SL 2.5% Yes Tax all. "New Technology" 
(intang.) assets 
50.0%    
PT 1998-1999 0.842 37.40 DB 35.7% SL 5.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. 8.0% 30.0%   
PT 2000-2001 0.846 35.20 DB 35.7% SL 5.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. 8.0% 30.0%   
PT 2002-2003 0.654 33.00 DB 35.7% SL 5.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. 20.0% 50.0%   
PT 2004-2005 0.761 27.50 DB 35.7% SL 5.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. 20.0%    
PT 2006 0.678 27.50 DB 35.7% SL 5.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. 20.0% 50.0%   
PT 2007 0.683 26.50 DB 35.7% SL 5.0% No Tax cr. Curr. & Cap. 20.0% 50.0%   
SE 1998-2007 1.011 28.00 DB 30.0% SL 4.0% No        
SK 1998-1999 1.069 40.00 Digi. 8 years Digi. 40 years Yes        
SK 2000-2001 1.042 29.00 Digi. 8 years Digi. 40 years Yes        
SK 2002 1.035 25.00 Digi. 8 years Digi. 40 years Yes        
SK 2003 1.033 25.00 Digi. 6 years Digi. 30 years Yes        
SK 2004-2007 1.023 19.00 Digi. 6 years Digi. 20 years Yes        
Source: IBFD (2009a), IBFD (2009b), Devereux et al. (2009), Own research. 
 
Table A-4: Identified applications from matching EPO Bulletin and AMADEUS / by host country of the applicant. 
Share of EPO applications from  AT BE CZ DE DK ES FI FR GB GR HU IE IT LU NL NO PL PT SE SK 
the specific country 0.60 0.68 0.33 0.70 0.81 0.51 0.85 0.59 0.74 0.02 0.36 0.50 0.65 0.39 0.86 0.74 0.37 0.37 0.88 0.19 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Table A-5: Identified applications from matching EPO Bulletin and AMADEUS / by year of priority. 
By year of priority 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Share of all EPO applications 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.23 
Share of EPO applications from EEA-countries 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.66 
Source: Own calculations. 
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